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Abstract
Indonesian constitutional reform after the fall of Soeharto’s New Order 
brings favorable direction for the judiciary. Constitutional guarantee of judicial 
independence as regulated in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, has closed 
dark memories in the past. This article decides that the Judiciary is held by 
the Supreme Court and the judicial bodies below and a Constitutional Court. 
Such a strict direction of regulation plus the transformation of the political 
system in a democratic direction should bring about the implementation of 
the independent and autonomous judiciary. But in reality, even though in a 
democratic political system and constitutional arrangement affirms the guarantee 
of independence, but it doesn’t represent the actual situation. There are some 
problems that remain, such as (i) the absence of a permanent format regarding 
the institutional relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional 
Court, and the Judicial Commission, and (ii) still many efforts to weaken 
judiciary through different ways such criminalization of judge. Referring to 
the problem above, then there are gaps between what “is” and what “ought”, 
among others. First, by changing political configuration that tends to be more 
democratic, the judiciary should be more autonomous. In this context, various 
problems arise such as (i) disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations 
between judicial power actors, (ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over 
their decisions, and (iii) judicial corruption. Second, by the constitutional 
guarantee of the independence of the judiciary, there will be no legislation that 
that may reduce constitutional guarantee. However, there are many legislation 
or regulations that still not in line with a constitutional guarantee concerning 
judicial independence. This paper reviews and describes in-depth about how to 
implement constitutional guarantees of judicial independence after the political 
transition and conceptualize its order to strengthen rule of law in Indonesia
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I. INTRODUCTION
After the fall of the New Order, the 1945 Constitution secure a constitutional 
guarantee of judicial independence. Judicial Independence was fully emphasized 
in Art 24 (1) of the 1945 Constitution, which was previously never been as clear 
as after amendments in mid-1999-2002.1 However, even though on constitutional 
stage has guaranteed independence of judiciary, but many legislation and 
regulations relating to judiciary contains several problems such as (i) some 
legislation are not synchronized especially on institutional relation between 
Supreme Court, Constitutional Court and Judicial Commission, and (ii) some 
legislation and regulation tried to weakening constitutional guarantee on 
independence of judiciary which was formulated on the 1945 Constitution.
The presence of judicial reform law package such as Judiciary Act on 
2004, Law Supreme Court Act on 2004, Constitutional Court Act on 2003, 
and Judicial Commission Act on 2004 which was compiled under democratic 
and participatory political structured, 2 but it still often received pressure and 
resistance especially through the judicial review.3 Therefore, another court reform 
law package such as Supreme Court Act in 2009, Judiciary Act on 2009 and 
Judicial Commission Act on 2011 and Constitutional Court Act in 2011 are existed 
to rearrange the relationship between the judiciary and judicial commission 
after Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006.4 However, on 
the other hand, another court reform law package such as Constitutional Court 
1 Elucidation of Art 24 and 25 of the 1945 Constitution: "Judiciary is an independent power, meaning that it is 
independent of the influence of the authority of the Government. In this regard, guarantees must be made in 
the Law regarding the position of judges."
2 Saldi Isra, Kekuasaan Kehakiman dalam Transisi Politik di Indonesia [Judicial Power Post Political Transition in 
Indonesia], in Komisi Yudisial, Problematika Hukum dan Peradilan di Indonesia [Law and Judiciary Problematics 
in Indonesia], (Jakarta: Judicial Commission of Republic Indonesia, 2014), 66-69.
3 For example, several supreme court judges submitted a petition for judicial review on Judicial Commission Act 
of 2004 and Judiciary Act of 2004 and registered as Case No. 005/PUU-IV/2006. It shows format and institutional 
disharmony between Supreme Court, Judicial Commission and Constitutional Court. In the case, the Constitutional 
Court granted part of the petition of the petitioners so that the authority of the Judicial Commission to support 
the function of creating responsible judiciary became confined. Even in the case, the Constitutional Court ruled 
itself that it could not be supervsed by the Judicial Commission. The Constitutional Court also provides judicial 
orders for legislators to carry out integral improvements for the harmonization and synchronization of the Law 
relating to Judiciary. This case shows that there is no permanent format for institutional relations after reforma-
tion in 1998. Zainal Arifin Hoesein, Kemerdekaan Kekuasaan Kehakiman [Judicial Independence] (Malang: Setara 
Pers, 2010), 39-40.
4 Duwi Handoko, Kekuasaan Kehakiman di Indonesia [Judicial Power in Indonesia] (Pekanbaru: Hawa dan Ahwa, 
2015), 19-22.
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Act on 2011, Juvenile Justice System Act on 2012, and the Supreme Court Bill in 
2011 brought legal policy which has a direction to restrain their independence, 
especially in decisional powers. 
Through Constitutional Court Act on 2011, Juvenile Justice System Act on 
2012, and the Supreme Court Bill in 2011, the judges are prohibited to make a 
decision that exceeds the limit (ultra petita). If the court makes a decision that 
can cause chaos situation, then the judge can be punished through criminal 
sanctions.5 Besides, criminalization of judges strictly appears in Juvenile Justice 
System Act on 2012, by providing two years imprisonment or a maximum of 
Rp.200,000,000.00 (two hundred million rupiah) as a criminal sanction if the 
judge does not use diversion.6  Referring to some legal problems as described, 
there are gaps between what “is” and what “ought to”, among others. First, by 
changes political configuration that tend to be more democratic, the judiciary 
should be more autonomous. 7 But in reality, various problems arise such as (i) 
disharmony in regulating the pattern of relations between judicial power actors, 
(ii) various attempts to criminalize judges over their decisions, (iii) judicial 
corruption. Second, by the constitutional guarantee of the independence of 
the judiciary, there will be no legislation that reduced constitutional guarantee. 
But in reality, many legislation or regulations that still not in line with a 
constitutional guarantee concerning judicial independence. This paper has the 
intent to reviews and analyzes in-depth about how to implement constitutional 
5 Art 97 third version of Supreme Court Bill of 2011: The “Supreme Court in the cassation level is prohibited: a. 
Making a decision that violates the law; b. Making a decision that causes confusion and damage and results 
in riots; c. Prohibited from making decisions it is impossible to implement because it is contrary to reality in 
the midst of society, customs, and habits that are hereditary so that it will lead to disputes and commotion, 
prohibited from changing the joint decision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Chairperson of the 
Judicial Commission, and/or Joint Decree on The Code of Ethics and Judicial Guidelines unilaterally” and Art 
57 (2a) of Constitutional Court Act of 2011: “The Constitutional Court Decision does not contain: a) Conclusion 
other than as referred to in paragraph (1) and paragraph (2); b) judicial order to the legislator, and c) creating 
of norms as a substitute norm that are declared contrary to the 1945 Constitution.”
6 Art 96 of Juvenile Justice System Act of 2011: “Investigators, Public Prosecutors and Judges who deliberately do 
not fulfill the obligations referred to in Art 7 (1) shall be sentenced to a maximum of two years imprisonment 
or a maximum fine IDR 200,000,000.00 (two hundred million rupiah).” Teguh Satya Bakhti, et.al. RUU Mahka-
mah Agung: Pengkajian Filosofi, Sejarah, Asas, Norma dalam Dinamika Perkembangan Ketatanegaraan Indonesia 
[Supreme Court Bill: Study on Philosophy, History, Principle, Norms in Constitutional Structure Development in 
Indonesia] (Jakarta: Research and Development Body on Supreme of Court, 2014), 88-90.
7 Benny K. Harman, Konfigurasi Politik dan Kekuasaan Kehakiman [Political Configuration and Judiciary] (Jakarta: 
Elsam, 1998), 40.
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guarantees of judicial independence and judicial accountability and conceptualize 
ideas to strengthening rule of law. 
In order to analyze main problem of this article, the discussion will consist 
of five parts, namely the I-V parts. Part I is an introduction intended to outline 
the main reasons why defining judicial independence and judicial accountability 
is important and explaining some anomaly that occurs in realizing the 
independence of judicial power and accountability after constitutional changes. 
Part II delivered a theoretical framework that will be used in this article and 
become an indicator of defining judicial independence and accountability. Part 
III describes the results of research and analyzes every stage of defining judicial 
independence into legislation and regulation and what needs to be done to 
realizing Art 24 (1) The 1945 Constitution to strengthening the concept rule 
of law. Part IV describing the results of research and analyze every stage on 
defining and implement judicial accountability as part judicial reform main 
agenda into legislation and regulation and what needs to be done to realizing 
Art 24 (1) The 1945 Constitution to propose transparency and accountability of 
the judiciary.  Part V draws the conclusions that conclude the article.
II. J U D I C I A L  I N D E P E N D E N C E  A N D  J U D I C I A L 
ACCOUNTABILITY
The nature of judicial independence are divided into two conceptions. The 
first concept of judicial independence is the personal independence of judges, 
in this concept, it is often analogous to as the concept of “authors of their own 
opinions.”8 The judiciary has realized its independence if the judges can make 
decisions without fear of internal (vertical) or external (horizontal) pressure to 
resolve cases with certain conditions. In other words, personal independence 
can be achieved when the output of the judicial process can reflect its judicial 
preferences.9 This conception often spoiled with core independence or personal 
independence (What judges think is what they produce).10 The second concept 
8 Lewis A. Kornhauser, “Is Judicial Independence a Useful Concept?”, in Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: 
An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. Stephen B. Burbank and Friedman Barry, (California: Sage, 2002), 42-55.
9 Theodore Becker, Comparative Judicial Politics (Landham: University Press of America, 1970), 1-8.
10 Ibid.
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of judicial independence is institutional independence.11 It appears that judicial 
independence depends on other branches of power, especially if it is associated 
with decisions that are routinely ignored or poorly implemented. This concept 
often interpreted as collective independence of institutional independence, or 
referred to maxim “what judges think is what they produce and what they 
produce controls the outcomes of legal conflicts.”12 The separation between 
personal (core) and institutional (collective) independence provides what Feld 
and Voigt said about de facto and de jure independence. Feld and Voigt define 
in more detail the component. De facto components include: (1) average tenure 
of judges; (2) deviation of the term of office of the judge; (3) number of judges 
dismissed; (4) the frequency of the number of judges being replaced in court; (5) 
salary of real judges; (6) judicial budget allocation; (7) the frequency of changes 
in basic regulations regarding judicial authority; and (8) the level  compliance 
of other branches with respect to judicial decisions.13 While the components 
of the judicial independence in a de jure including (1) the ability to maintain 
constitutional norms; (2) level of complexity in changing the constitution, (3) 
judge’s selection mechanism; (4) judge’s tenure, (5) judge’s retirement; (6) 
procedure for dismissal; (7) the possibility of re-elected; (8) judges’ salaries; (9) 
accessibility to become a Chief Justice; (10) case allocation; (11) judicial review; and 
(12) accountability and transparency of the judiciary.14  
11 The Federalist United States in the Federalist papers 78th argued, lack of financial support and the judicial infra-
structure is an “intervention”, the judicial authorities to rely on the help of other branches of power actively to 
appreciate the existence and leeway in the decision making. James Madison, et al., The Federalist Papers (New 
York: New American Library, 1961), 112.
12 Charles M. Cameron, “Judicial Independence: How Can You Tell It When You See It? And, Who Cares?” in Judicial 
Independence at the Crossroads. An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. Stephen B. Burbank and Friedman Barry (Cali-
fornia: Sage, 2002), 42-55 and Christopher M. Larkins, “Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical 
and Conceptual Analysis,” American Journal of Comparative Law 44 no. 4, (1996): 605-626.
13 The components of de facto are: (1) average length of tenure; (2) deviation of average length of tenure from de 
jure prescriptions; (3) number of judges removed from office; (4) frequency of changes in the number of judges 
in the court;¡ (5) real salary of judges; (6) real court’s budget; (7) number of constitutional changes in relevant 
articles; and (8) compliance by other branches on court rulings. Lars P Feld and Stefan Voigt, “Economic Growth 
and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators,” European Journal of Political 
Economy 19, no. 1 (2003): 497-527.
14 The components of de jure are: (1) whether the highest court is anchored in the constitution; (2) how difficult is 
it to amend the constitution, (3) appointment procedure of judges; (4) their length of tenure, (5) whether there 
is a fixed retirement age of judges in the court; (6) removal procedures; (7) whether the reelection of judges is 
possible; (8) protection and adequacy of salary of judges; (9) accessibility to the highest court; (10) procedure 
for allocation of cases in the court; (11) judicial review ; and (12) transparency of the court. Lars P Feld and 
Stefan Voigt, “Economic Growth”.
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 Accountability is the same as the judicial independence, both of which are 
important foundations for the rule of law.15 On a sociological level, the court 
obtains public trust rather than because of its independence guaranteed through 
legal norms.16 Accountability makes the judicial authority’s ruling becomes more 
respected.17 Therefore, the enforcement of a code of ethics for the position of 
the judge becomes an important foundation as the core of judicial accountability 
for personal independence, so judicial access becomes a supporting foundation 
for the achievement of institutional accountability. It appears that there is a 
separation of meaning which is the foundation of judicial accountability, namely 
"(1) the judge who is accountable to the law, to the higher principles of justice, 
and to her own sense of ethical responsibility, and (2) the judge who is deemed 
“accountable” only to the extent that he is held accountable by some external force 
with powers of discipline or retribution."18 According to David Pamintel, some 
corridors can be understood as a cornerstone is the "First, we all want judges 
who will follow the law, respecting and applying proper legislative enactments, 
setting aside any personal legislative agenda." In this opinion, David Pamintel 
expressed his great hope to the judge to be able to do “the right thing” for a 
judge even though the phrase “the right thing” cannot be measured normatively.19 
Ferejohn and Kramer explained,
No one really believes that law is wholly indeterminate, but virtually 
everyone recognizes that modem jurisprudential tools create a range of 
legitimate choices in almost any given case. And even those who believe 
15 David Pamintel stated “ The rule of law further requires that no public official be above the law or exempt from 
its requirements. While public officials enjoy a measure of immunity while working in their official capacities. 
The rule of law requires that they are nonetheless be subject to the same laws as every other individual outside 
the sphere of their official duties.” David Pimentel, “Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability in A 
Transitional State,” Pacific Basin Law Journal 33, no. 2 (2016):155-157.
16 Lorne Neudorf argues when the judiciary is either consumed or subject to influence or intimidation by corrupt of-
ficials, groups, or individuals, the citizens will not trust it, and they will lack confidence that the resort to the judicial 
process will become a just resolution of their contractions.  Lorne Neudorf, The Dynamics of Judicial Independence: 
A Comparative Study of Courts in Malaysia and Pakistan (Canada: Springer, 2012), 229.
17 David Pimentel argues that “Public confidence in the courts is inspired not so much by independence as by account-
ability: if the public perceives the court to make principled decisions based on the law, and without corrupt motive 
or influence, they will trust the judiciary and abide by its decisions. A judge may be deemed “accountable,” by just 
about any definition, if he adheres to the normative ethical and legal principles of her culture and society.” David 
Pimentel, “Balancing Judicial Independence,” 159.
18 David Pimentel, “Reframing the Independence v. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure in Light of 
Judges› Courage and Integrity,” Cleveland State Law Review 51, no 1 (2015): 13-14.
19 David Pimentel, “Reframing the Independence”.
Defining Judicial Independence and Accountability Post Political Transition
300 Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
in objectively “right” answers appreciate that the process by which these 
answers are generated hinges on arguments and judgments of a kind about 
reasonable people can (and will) subjectively disagree.20
David Pamintel concluded that the meaning of “the right thing” was that 
the judge did not exceed the “cross the line” limits, so that the meaning of 
accountability in the first corridor was how to position the judge as a dignified 
and dignified position for his actions over not exceeding the limit (law).21 As 
for the second, David Pamintel stated
The second issue for consensus - and a far easier one to assert - is that 
the judge is striving to do “a” (if not “the”) right thing should do it for 
the right reason. Biases, outside pressures, contests of interest, and other 
self-dealing or self-interested behaviors are all anathema to the proper and 
ethical exercise of judicial powers. Here the focus is not on the decision itself 
being wrong-indeed, the judge’s brother-in law may well have deserved to 
win the case under the law anyway-but with the judges’ improper reasons 
for rendering that decision. These expectations we have of the judges are 
tied up in the concept of accountability.22
For this matter, David Pamintel gave a classification regarding the 
accountability of the judiciary into two parts among other "(1) personal 
accountability and (2) institutional accountability. Personal accountability is 
interpreted as the subjective or personal accountability of the judge that comes 
from within; one’s internal moral compass is not a function of one’s vulnerability to 
discipline or other retribution for misdeeds."23 Accountability that is born from 
within a judge is due to the integrity that is already inherent and “maintained” 
to remain inherent in him.24 Such expectations are considered to be maintained if 
supported by the supervision and enforcement of ethical norms to maintain the 
nobility of the judge’s position. Therefore, the involvement of the institution in 
charge of this is a relevant choice for realizing personal accountability. Whereas 
concerning institutional accountability, it refers to David Pamintel’s opinion that
20 John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, “Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Re-
straint,” New York University Law Review 77, no. 2 (2002): 962-963.
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Judges cannot be allowed to run amok and must be held accountable for 
their own lapses of ethics or other abuses of judicial authority. A disciplinary 
regime must be in place to police judicial misconduct, and those enforcement 
mechanisms will be observable, both on paper and-unless it is an entirely 
confidential process-in operation. When the public is outraged by “Judicial 
activists” they will call for “more accountability” in terms of enhanced power 
to rein in the perceived miscreant judges.25 
Placing institutional accountability hopes that the judicial institution will 
become the “right thing” because its actions are institutionally correct. For 
Zainal Arifin Mochtar, the holding of accountable power will further increase 
public confidence. Accountability of the judiciary is very dependent on the 
accountability of judges. Decisions produced by judges must be legally justified. 
The judge only decides based on the evidence at the trial with the consideration 
to uphold the law and bring justice.
III. DEFINING INDEPENDENCE
After being appointed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1996, Sarwata 
said that the first thing he intends to do was to conduct internal consolidation.26 
Sarwata keeping his promises together with his successors to maintains 
consolidate even though invisible.27 Judicial reform itself declared since the 
amendment to the 1945 Constitution and when Bagir Manan appointed as Chief 
Justice in 2001.28 By broad support, especially from newly appointed non-career 
judges,29 reformist judges and officials, civil society groups and donor agencies, 
slowly but surely the first judicial reform agenda has proceeded as it should. 
25 Ibid., 21.
26 Rifqi S. Assegaf, “Judicial Reform in Indonesia 1998-2006,” in Reforming Laws and Institutions in Indonesia: An 
Assessment, ed. Naoyuki Sakumoto and Hikmahanto Juwana (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies Japan 
External Trade Organization, 2007), 11-12.
27 Rifqi S. Assegaf said “up until the end of his leadership in 2000, the Supreme Court - and the Indonesian courts 
in general - were never more solid in maintaining the status quo. The appointment of Ketut Suraputra as acting 
Chief Justice in 2000, and who was followed by Taufik, brought about almost no discernible changes.” Rifqi S. 
Assegaf, “Judicial Reform,” 13.
28 Sebastiaan Pompe, Judicial Reforms in Indonesia: Transparency, Accountability and Fighting Corruption, presented 
during the International Conference and Showcase on Judicial Reforms held at the Shangri-la Hotel, Makati City, 
Philippines on 28-30 November 2005. 4-5.
29 Anna Erlyana said “There were 9 noncareer justices appointed in 2000, which constitutes almost 20 % of the total 
justices in the Supreme Court.” Anna Erlyana, “Administrative Court and Legal Reform Since 1998 In Indonesia,” 
in Reforming Laws and Institutions in Indonesia: An Assessment, ed. Naoyuki Sakumoto and Hikmahanto Juwana 
(Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, 2007), 83-84.
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The first stage of judicial reform agenda to defining constitutional guarantee 
of judicial independence is a one-roof system policy. The adoption of a one-
stop system has a historical connection with the Association of Indonesia’s 
Judges (Ikatan Hakim Indonesia or IKAHI) memorandum on “Improvement 
of Judiciary Position Accordance to the 1945 Constitution” which explained in 
IKAHI’s National Conference at Ujung Pandang in October 23rd, 1996. In 1997, 
Ali Budiarto Secretary-General IKAHI, proposed that the Judiciary Act on 1970 
to be reviewed. The proposal was submitted because some articles in Judiciary 
Act on 1970 were replicas of Judiciary Act on 1964, which provide legality for 
executive (president or government) intervention on behalf of revolution.30 After 
fall of the New Order, this effort finally materialized in Judiciary Act on 1999 
which amended Judiciary Act on 1970 by provided Art 11 which turn judicial 
administration from two roof systems into one roof system.31 Beside, Judiciary 
Act on 1999 also regulating the transfer of organizational, administrative and 
financial affairs of judges from the Ministry of Justice into the Supreme Court, 
and also regulates General Court’s jurisdiction to deal cases involving members 
of the Army, unless otherwise determined by the Supreme Court. However, 
at that day, one roof system has not been implemented properly, because the 
organizational, administrative and financial affairs of Religious Courts and 
Military Courts Judges are still under the Ministry of Religion and the Ministry 
of Defense. The transfer of this one roof system completed in 2004 through 
Judiciary Act 2004 which eliminates Judiciary Act on 1970 and Judiciary Act 
on 1999.
After one roof system stage, the next stage is the establishment of special 
courts. For Rikardo Simarmata, there are two main factors underlie formation 
special courts.32 First, the need to create a debt settlement mechanism and 
business certainty for investors to implement the Letter of Intent (LoI) agreement 
30 Ibid., 38.
31 Art 11 Judiciary Act of 1999.
32 Rikardo Simarmata, “Politik Hukum Peradilan di Indonesia Masa Orde Baru dan Reformasi [Court Legal Policy 
on New Order and Reformation Era in Indonesia]” in Putih Hitam Pengadilan Khusus [Black and White of Special 
Court], Judicial Commission (Jakarta: Secretariat General of the Judicial Commission, 2013), 145-146.
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between the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
LoI requires structural adjustments including in the judicial sector. According 
to Tim Lindsey, the commercial court is one of the courts made by this 
framework.33 Besides establishing a commercial court, the LoI requires another 
adjustment through minimizing the role of the state (neo-liberal), which results 
in establishing a labor court as a substitute for the Tripartite. Previously, the 
settlement of disputes between employers and workers was handled by third 
parties as the government side, meanwhile, in the labor court, employers and 
workers were confronted directly without the presence of a government.34 The 
second factor is the need to overcome the gap between the judicial reform 
agenda and external demands (public pressure and markets).35 As mentioned 
earlier, the judicial reform process has slow movement until 2004. This condition 
is connected with the failure of legislation reform which did not necessarily 
exclude corrupt behavior or increases the professionalism of judges. This situation 
increase mistrust to the judiciary and forming special courts as a way out. 36 
Bagir Manan has a view that the presence of a special court was to guarantee 
the quality and accuracy of court decisions.37 For Adriaan Bedner, the special 
court was intended to improve the performance of judicial services which had 
33 Tim Lindsey, Legal Infrastructure and Governance Reform in Post-Crisis Asia: The Case of Indonesia, in Asian-
Pacific Economic Literature (Sydney: Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, The Australian National 
University dan Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd, 2005), 2.
34 Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman, “Good Governance and Legal Reform in Indonesia” (Thesis, Faculty of Graduate 
Studies Mahidol University, 2007), 4.
35  Rikardo Simarmata, “Politik Hukum Peradilan di Indonesia [Court Legal Policy on New Order and Reformation 
Era in Indonesia],” 147.
36 The formation of a new government /state institution in response to existing distrust of government/state institu-
tions is a symptomatic act. This action resulted in the formation of dozens of independent state agencies in the 
form of state auxiliary organs and executive branch agencies. The independent state institution has collaborative 
powers of executive, legislative and judicial. Zainal Arifin Mochtar, “Penataan Lembaga Negara Independen di 
Indonesia [Reorganizing State Auxiliary Organ in Indonesia]” (Dissertation, Faculty at Law University of Gadjah 
Mada, 2012), 149.
37 Bagir Manan said there is a growing opinion supporting the formation of special courts to guarantee accuracy 
and quality of court verdicts. To avoid misunderstandings, many people refer to these as chambers, which means 
that they still remain under the courts as laid out in current regulations. Forming special courts (Courts/cham-
bers outside the four current divisions), would not be an easy task as it would have to be based on a regulation 
which would involve the government and legislative assembly, and would also affect the state budget. Lastly it 
would require specialization of the judges in specific areas of law, all this would entail a lot of time and effort 
to bring forth. Bagir Manan, Independence of the Judiciary: Indonesian Experience (Speech on Celebrating the 
50th Anniversary of Supreme Court of Pakistan), 3.
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a deteriorating image.38 Therefore, it can be concluded that the establishment 
special courts is a reflection institutional independence of judiciary.
After the reformation, the idea to  establish a special court was developed, 
especially for fulfilling demands of judicial reform. At the end of New Order, a 
special court was formed, namely the Juvenile Court based on Child Protection 
Act on 1997. Besides, the decentralization of government and diversification of 
function of the and liberalization and democratization is in all areas of life, 
therefore, a special court are increasingly being established by the Government. 
Commercial Court is established in 1998, by Emergency Act on 1998 which was 
later passed into Commercial Court Act on 1998. Subsequently, in 2000 and 2002, 
followed by the establishment of the Human Rights Court,39 and the Corruption 
Court.40 In addition, Labor Court41 and Fisheries Court.42 In the end, until mid-
2005, more than 12 types of special courts had been established, among other: 
(1) Juvenile Court43 (criminal law); (2) Commercial Court44 (civil law); (3) Human 
Rights Court45 (criminal law); (4) Corruption Court46 (field of criminal law); (5) 
Labor Court47  (civil law); (6) Fisheries Court48 (criminal law); (7) Tax Court49 
(Administrative Law); (8) Shipping Court (field of civil law); (9) Sharia Court50 
in Aceh (Islamic law); (10) Customary Courts in Papua51 (execution of decisions 
related to District court); (11) the Traffic Court52 (criminal law) and recently, 
38  Adriaan Bedner said the strategy to establish special courts to improve judicial performance has been central to 
Indonesian policies pertaining to the administration of justice. In combination with attempts to reinforce dispute 
settlement outside the court system - for instance by regulating and promoting mediation, and by establishing 
Human Right’s Commission and Ombudsman - this should ultimately lead to a complete restructuring of the 
judiciary. Adriaan Bedner, “Rebuilding the Judiciary in Indonesia: The Special Courts Strategy,” Yuridika 23, no. 
3 (September-December 2008), 230.
39 Human Rights Court Act of 2000.
40 Corruption Eradication Commission Act of 2002.
41 Labor Court Act of 2004.
42 Fisheries Act of 2004.
43 Juvenile Court Act of 1997 juncto Juvenile Court System Act of 2011.
44 Bankruptcy Act of 2004.
45 The Human Rights Court Act of 2000.
46 Corruption Eradication Commission of 2002.
47 Labor Court Act of 2004.
48 Fisheries Act of 2004.
49 Tax Court Act of 2002.
50 Presidential Decree Number 11 of 2003 concerning Syariah Court and Syariah Court for Province of Aceh.
51 Papua Special Autonomy Act of 2001.
52 Indonesian Republic Police Act of 2002.
Defining Judicial Independence and Accountability Post Political Transition
305Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
(12) regional head election court53 (constitutional and administrative law). In 
fact, according to Jimly Asshiddiqie, there were always new ideas to form other 
special courts which are generally intended to make law enforcement more 
effective in certain fields, such as forestry court, and so on.54 Not only special 
court which explicitly and officially referred to as a court, Jimly Asshiddiqie 
also notes that many growing and developing institutions which, although not 
explicitly referred to as courts, have the authority and work mechanism like ‘a 
court’.55 The institutions which are ‘judicial’ but not referred to as courts, or 
known theoretically as quasi-court or semi-court.56 Some of them are in the form 
of state commissions, but some others use the term body or even authority. 
These institutions, besides being judicial, but often mixed functions with 
regulatory functions and/or administrative functions.57 Some examples include: 
(1) Anti-Monopoly Supervisory Commission (Komisi Pengawasan Persaingan 
Usaha or KPPU);58 (2) Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia 
or KPI);59 (3) Central Information Commission (Komisi Informasi Pusat or KIP) 
and Regional Information Commission (Komisi Informasi Daerah or KID);60 
(4) Election Supervisory Agency (Badan Pengawas Pemilu or Bawaslu);61 (5) 
Ombudsman (Ombudsman Republik Indonesia or ORI); 62 (6) Financial Service 
Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan or OJK).63
53 Regional Head Election Act of 2016.
54 According to Jimly Asshiddiqie, sometimes the initiatives come from members of House of Representatives/
DPR, but sometimes also come from the Government itself which often not based on the results of integrated 
studies, mostly because of weak coordination between government agencies themselves. That is why, special 
courts continue to grow and increase in number after reform. Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Pengadilan Khusus [Special 
Court]” in Putih Hitam Pengadilan Khusus [Black and White of Special Courts], ed. Judicial Commission (Jakarta: 
Information Center of Secretary General Judicial Commission, 2013), 5-6.
55 Based on law, such institutions have authority to examine and decide or dispute on legal violation cases, and 
even certain ethical violations cases with final and binding decisions. The meaning is to provide justice for the 
parties who have been harmed. Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Pengadilan Khusus [Special Court],” 11.
56 Ibid.
57 Regulatory functions can be linked to legislative functions according to trias politica doctrine, while administra-
tive functions are identical to executive functions. Therefore, state commissions or institutions that have the 
authority it can be said an institution that has a mixed function. Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Pengadilan Khusus [Special 
Court],” 13.
58 This institution was formed based on Anti-Monopoly Act of 1999.
59 Broadcasting Act of 2002.
60 Public Information Disclosure Act of 2008.
61 Election Organizer Act of 2011.
62 Originally this institution was named the National Ombudsman Commission formed based on Presidential Decree 
Number 44 of 2000. In 2008, the position of this institution was increased and its name was changed to the 
Ombudsman of Republic of Indonesia (ORI) based on Ombudsman Act of 2008.
63  Financial Services Authority Act of 2011.
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In the third stage, the judicial reform agenda were institutionalizing the 
judicial review into the judiciary. The establishment of the Constitutional Court 
is a purpose to realize constitutional review.64 On the other hand, the supreme 
court has authority to legality review. In case of exercise Constitutional Court 
authority on constitutional review during the transition period,  the Supreme 
Court has issued Supreme Court Regulation Number 2 on 2002 concerning 
Procedures for Organizing Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court 
Authority. After then, Supreme Court Regulation No 1 of 2011 which states 
that to submit application for judicial review is carried out by (1) directly to 
the Supreme Court and (2) through the District Court in charge of applicant’s 
domicile.65 Based on this provision, character judicial review at the Supreme 
Court concerns public law issues so judicial review was handled by the chamber 
of Administration case. This is similar to the administrative court process in 
other countries which have authority to review general binding rules including 
general policy regulations as long as they cause legal consequences, but do not 
include in judicial review. 66 After the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution and 
provide Constitutional Court Act on 2003, the Constitutional Court began to 
operationalize the authority of constitutional review. 
64  Jimly Asshiddiqie stated that constitutional review and judicial review must be distinguished. The distinction 
is made at least for two reasons. First, constitutional reviews other than those carried out by judges but also 
carried out by institutions other than judges or courts, depending on which institution the Constitution provides 
the authority to do so. Second, the origins concept of judicial review has broader understanding of the object, 
for example legality review under the regulation against legislation, while the constitutional review only con-
cerns reviewing its constitutionality. Jimly Asshiddiqie, Model-Model Pengujian Konstitusional di Berbagai Negara 
[Comparative Constitutional Review Models] (Jakarta: Konpress, 2006), 2-3.
65 Art 31A Supreme Court Act of 2009 Juncto Art 20 (2) letter c and paragraph (3) Judiciary Act of 2009 compare 
with Art 2 (3) Supreme Court Regulation of 1993.
66 Paulus Effendie Lotulung, who once stated administration court have resolved jurisdiction to administration 
at first instances, high administration courts for the second instance and the supreme court for cassation and 
judicial reviews. Paulus Efendi Lotulung. State Administration Courts in Indonesia’s Judiciary System (10th Con-
gress International Association of Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions, Sydney, Australia, Sunday 7-Thursday 
11 March, 2010), 1. Imam Soebechi, the Supreme Court Judge once said that the Supreme Court’s authority to 
review regional regulation would be handed down to the administrative court. However, the idea of  the Supreme 
Court has consequences for the review of the concepts of regeling and beschikking, because so far administrative 
court has only resolved disputes in the clusters of administrative decisions (beschikking), not regulatory disputes 
(regeling). Besides these two ideas, the plan to amend the Constitutional Court Act was also tried to be groped 
so that the Constitutional Court would not only review the constitutionality of the legislation, but also be able to 
review all level laws and regulations, including the Regional Regulation. Enrico Simanjuntak, “Kewenangan Hak 
Uji Materiil pada Mahkamah Agung [Supreme Court Authority for Judicial Review],” Jurnal Hukum & Peradilan 
15, no. 3 (2015), 346.
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In the fourth stage, judicial reform has focused on minimizing political 
intervention on the appointment and dismissal process of judges. Art 24A (2) of 
the 1945 Constitution has determined Supreme Court Judges must have integrity 
and have good and fair personality, professionality and experienced at law. 
Meanwhile, Art 24C (5) of the 1945 Constitution has determined Constitutional 
Court Judges must have integrity and has good and fair personality, statesmen 
who are experts at the constitutions, and not concurrently state officials. It is not 
known exactly why the conditions are made differently, even though still there 
are similarities between them. Chief Justice is required to be experienced at law, 
while Constitutional Justices must be expert at the constitution. In addition to 
the terms and conditions to be Chief Justice, constitutional justices and judges 
under the Supreme Court, after the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, ad 
hoc judges were introduced. Even though among the six special courts act that 
regulate ad hoc judges, none of them provides a clear enough understanding of 
what is meant by the ad hoc judge. General norms concerning all conditions 
of Supreme Court Judges which stipulated at The 1945 Constitution are further 
elaborated in Supreme Court Act on 1985 as amended by Supreme Court Act on 
2004 and Supreme Court Act on 2009. On the other hand, terms and condition 
of the Constitutional Court Judges are stipulated in Constitutional Court Act on 
2003 as amended by Constitutional Court Act on 2011 jo Constitutional Court 
Act on 2014. However, in 2014, Constitutional Court Act on 2014 was revoked 
by the Constitutional Court through Decision Number 1-2/PUU-XII/2014. 
Regarding terms and conditions of the Supreme Court Judges, Supreme Court 
on 1985 distinguishes divide the path by separated between career judges 
and non-career judges. Non-career candidates must have at least 15 years of 
experienced at law. 67 Later on, experienced condition refined and increased 
through Supreme Court Act on 2004. 68 Some changes occur through Supreme 
Court Act on 2009 which reduced experience conditions and add another 
condition.69 According Supreme Court Act on 2004 where previously for non-
67  Art 7 (2) Supreme Court Act of 2004.
68  Art 7 Supreme Court Act 2004. 
69  Art 7 (3) Supreme Court Act 2009.
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career paths must have experienced at least 25 years, now revised to 20 years. 
Meanwhile, career candidates must have experienced 20 years and have ever 
at least 3 years have been high judges. 70 Another education level condition for 
non-career candidates must have a master and doctoral degrees, while career 
candidates are masters, and both of these pathways require a Bachelor at Law 
degree. It cannot be known with certainty why the conditions for having a 
master’s degree are applied to candidates from career paths. Therefore, the 
requirement for Supreme Court Judges can be categorized as follows:
Table 1. Categorization of Requirements for Supreme Court Judges
Description Career Candidates Non-Career Candidates
Nationality Indonesian Citizen
Religious Faith in God 
Age Minimum 45 years Maximum 60 years
Level Educa-
tion
Masters of law with a 
Bachelor of law degree 
or other Bachelor degree 
which related with law
Doctor of Law or Masters of law 
with a Bachelor of law degree 
or other Bachelor degree which 
related with law
Experienced At least 20 years become 
a judge, including at least 
3 years as a high court 
judge
Experience in the legal profession 




Able to be physical and psychological to carry out duties 
Behavior Never been imposed 
temporary termination 
due to violations code of 
conduct and/or judges 
guidelines
Never been sentenced to 
imprisonment based on a court 
of law for committing a crime 
that is threatened with 5 years 
or more imprisonment 
Specific Terms Must have integrity and has good and fair personality, 
professionalism and experienced at law.
70  Art 7 (3) Supreme Court Act 2009.
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On the matter selection of judge mechanism, before the Amendment 
the 1945 Constitution, there were no clear rules. The law only stipulates 
that candidates for supreme court judges are proposed by the DPR to the 
President. Then, the President as head of state appoints by political decision. 
DPR also has to consult with Supreme Court and the government through 
the Ministry of Justice.71 However, after the reformation era, the process of 
selecting Supreme Court Justice has a different route. DPR took over the role 
of the government and the Supreme Court at the election process. Since 2000 
the selection mechanism for supreme justices has been carried out through a 
mechanism called fit and proper tests.72 This model is a new step on finding 
Supreme Court Justice who is clean and has high moral integrity. The fit and 
proper test mechanism began with nominations from the Supreme Court and 
the government. Besides, DPR opens up the possibility of nominating non-
career judges which can be submitted either by the government or other parties 
such as NGOs, Indonesian Judges Association (Ikatan Hakim Indonesia) and 
Indonesian Advocates Association (Perhimpunan Advokat Indonesia).73  From 17 
judges which selected in 2009, among them were non-career judges from legal 
academics and legal practitioners, while the other 8 judges were career judges. 
The involvement of academics and legal practitioners outside career judges is 
intended to improve court performance.74 This process upholds the principle of 
transparency, which is enough to provide opportunities for a broader community 
to participate and increase objectivity in the selection process. 75 However, this 
71 Art 8 Supreme Court Act of 1985.
72 Initially, the fit and proper test were carried out by Central Bank of Indonesia against officials who lead a Bank 
through the Controlling Shareholders, Managers (Commissioners and Directors), to Executive Officers. The fit 
and proper test in banks is regulated in Minister of Finance Decree No. 52/KMK.017/1999 and Governor Central 
bank of Indonesia Decree No 31/12/Kep/GBI, dated February 8th, 1999. According to this joint decree, it was de-
termined that every election of directors or leaders in the banking environment must go through a fit and proper 
test. Zaenal Arifin, Fit and Proper Test dalam Proses Pemilihan Pejabat Negara [Fit and Proper Stest Mechanism 
in State’s Official Selection] (Jakarta: Final Report Legal Research Team, 2005), 14-15.
73 Three things that can be used in the fit and proper test. First is moral integrity. Second, vision and mission, and 
third, legal understanding. These three things were assessed in the fit and proper test process. This model is 
expected to minimize the opportunity for bad track record judges. Zainal Arifin Mochtar and Iwan Satriawan, 
“Efektivitas Sistem Penyeleksian Pejabat Komisi Negara di Indonesia [Efectivity on State’s Commisioner Selec-
tion in Indonesia],” Jurnal Konstitusi 6, no. 3 (September 2009), 151-152.
74 Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional (KRHN), Mahkamah Agung di Masa Transisi [Supreme Court in Transition 
Era] (Jakarta; KRHN, 2001), 25.
75 The Academic Studies on Judicial Commission Bill of 2004, 19.
Defining Judicial Independence and Accountability Post Political Transition
310 Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
method also brought some weaknesses. First, transparency has not been fully 
implemented. There is still a dark room that is far from public monitoring. 
DPR’s assessment has not been done accountably, there are still considerations 
beyond the objective results of the selection. The public does not know how 
DPR members provide an assessment of integrity, legal understanding, or vision 
and mission of candidates. There is a strong suspicion that some members of 
the DPR have made judgments based on personal or political interests, or even 
there was bribery in the process. 76 Second, the lack of public participation. The 
time given to the public to participate in observing and making complaints 
related to the candidate is still too short and insufficient. Third, the objective 
parameters used to assess candidates still unclear. Fourth, the qualifications of 
the selected candidates have not matched to the needs of the Supreme Court. 
Fifth, some DPR members acted or argued in an unethical manner during the 
fit and proper test process, which disrespect judge candidates.77 
Finally, the selection process by the DPR puts political interests ahead.78 
Therefore, the establishment of the Judicial Commission which has the authority 
to propose the appointment of Supreme Judges and has other authorities to 
maintain and uphold the honor, dignity and behavior of judges implies that the 
Judicial Commission has taken over functions previously held by the Supreme 
Court, President and DPR. The Judicial Commission acts as a selection committee 
for judges who will be elected by the DPR. The Judicial Commission proposes 
three candidates for each vacancy in the Supreme Court.79 According to Fajrul 
Falaakh, recruitment methods involving the role of the Judicial Commission, 
Parliament and the President called the multi-voter model because involves 
many parties on Supreme Court Judges selection process. 80
76 Mahkamah Agung, Cetak Biru Pembaharuan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia [Blue Print Reformation of 
Supreme Court] (Jakarta: Supreme Court of Republic Indonesia, 2003), 69.
77 Ibid.
78 One practice that becomes an indicator is the unfolding of the “toilet lobby” scandal which was revealed when 
the fit and proper test was carried out for the Legal Commission on House of Representatives in 2013. Saldi 
Isra, “Meluruskan Kuasa DPR [Redirecting the Power of House of Representative],” Kompas, October 13, 2013.
79 Art 18 (5) Judicial Commission Act on 2004.
80 Fajrul Falaakh, Transparansi dan Akuntabilitas Yudikatif di Indonesia [Transparency and Judicial Accountability in 
Indonesia] (Human Rights Training Materials for the Judicial Commission Network, Denpasar, June 22 – 26th, 2010 
and Bandung, June 29th – July 3rd, 2010). Organized by PUSHAM UII in collaboration with the Judicial Commission 
and Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR), 19-20.
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On the matter of constitutional judge, it has been stipulated in Art 24C 
of 1945 Constitution. Art 24C (3) of the 1945 Constitution states that the 
Constitutional Court has nine constitutional judges which selected by President 
for three judges, DPR for three judges, and Supreme court for the last three 
judges. Also, Art 24C (5) of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that constitutional 
Justices must have integrity and personality that is not impeccable, fair, 
statesmen, and not concurrently as state officials. The constitutional foundation 
is further regulated in Art 15 and Art 18 (1) of Constitutional Court Law on 
2003. Art 19 and Art 20 (2) of the Constitutional Court Law on 2003 also states 
that the nomination and election of constitutional justices must be carried 
out transparently and participative, as well as objectively and accountably. In 
terms of appointment procedures of constitutional justices, Art 20 (1) of the 
Constitutional Court Law on 2003 stipulates that selection process, election, 
and submission of constitutional judges are regulated by each institution, 
namely the Supreme Court, DPR, and President.81 The conditions changed 
Constitutional Court Law on 2011, especially on level education, experience, 
and age. The constitutional judge candidates must be a doctor and master’s 
degree of law with at least 15 years of experience in legal professional and/or 
has been a state official. To become a constitutional judge is at least 47 years 
old or at most 65 years of age at the time of appointment. 82 Another revision 
for constitutional judge requirements re-occurs on Emergency Law on 2013. The 
requirements for the level of education from having a master and doctor of law 
degree changed to only a doctor of law degree. Another new requirement is 
the candidate must have been stopped become a member of a political party 
for 7 years as a minimum period before being submitted as a constitutional 
judge candidate. 83 Those new requirements considered contrary to the 1945 
Constitution,84 and therefore some people submitted a petition to review the 
law to the Constitutional Court.85  In the end, the constitutional court stated 
81 Art 16 Constitutional Court Act of 2003.
82 Art 15 Constitutional Court Act of 2011.
83 Art 15 Government Regulation in Lieu of Law of 2013 concerning Constitutional Court.
84 Constitutional Court Decisions Number 1-2/PUU-XII/2014, 13.
85 Constitutional Court Decisions Number 81/PUU-IX/2011, 60.
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that those regulations regarding having stopped being a member of a political 
party was not contrary to the 1945 Constitution.86 According to the explanation, 
selection and appointment process contains the split and quota perspective. 
Deciphering the juridical concept of the selection and appointment process of 
constitutional judges is explained in the following table:
Table 2. Juridical concepts of selection and 
appointment process of constitutional judges
The 1945 
Constitution
Judiciary Act Constitutional Court Act
Appointment of  9 
constitutional judges 
determined by the 
P re s i d e n t  b e g i n s 
with a submission 
of 3 constitutional 
justices by the House 
of Representatives, 
the President and the 
Supreme Court. [Art 
24C (3)]
S u b m i s s i o n o f 
each o f  the 3 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
j u d ge s  by t h e 
Supreme Court, 
Parliament and 
President. [Art 34 
(1)]
Determination of the president 
through a presidential decree to 
appoint 9 constitutional justices 
submitted by 3 constitutional 
just ices by the House of 
Representatives, the President 
and the Supreme Court no 
later than 7 working days from 
the submission of candidates 
received by the President. (Art 18)
Constitutional judges 
must have integrity 
and personality, fair, 
statesmen, and not 
state officials [Art 24C 
(5)]
The requirement 
to be a 
constitutional 





The requirement to be a 
const i tut ional  judge i s  a 
statesman, integrity, personality 
and fair. (Art 15)
86  Ibid. 
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The 1945 
Constitution
Judiciary Act Constitutional Court Act
Te r m s o f  c a n d i d a te s  fo r 
constitutional judges: Indonesian 
citizens, doctoral and masters 
with a bachelor’s degree at 
law, Believe in God Almighty 
and have a noble character, 
minimum age of 47 years and a 
maximum of 65 years at the time 
of appointment, physically and 
spiritually capable in carrying 
out their duties, they have never 
been sentenced to imprisonment 
based on court decisions, are 
not declared bankrupt based on 
court decisions, have legal work 
experience of at least 15 years 
and/or have been state officials. 
Administrative requirements for 
candidates for constitutional 
justices: a statement to become a 
constitutional judge, curriculum 
vitae, copy of education certificate 
that has been legalized, a list of 
assets and a source of income 
accompanied by valid supporting 
documents and approved by the 
institution authorized person 
and taxpayer number (Art 15)
Prohibitions on the position 
of  constitutional judges as 
other state officials, members 
of political parties, employers, 
advocates, civil servants. (Art 17)
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The 1945 
Constitution
Judiciary Act Constitutional Court Act
R e g a r d i n g  t h e 
a p p o i n t m e n t  o f 
constitutional justices 
and the conditions 
stipulated in the law. 
[Art 24C (6) and Art 
25]
The elements of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
judge submission 
cons i s t  o f  the 
n o m i n a t i o n 
concept which 
i s  c a r r i e d  ou t 
transparently and 
participative, and 
the concept of 
election carried 
out in an objective 
and accountable 
manner. [Art 34 (2) 
and (3)]
The nomination of constitutional 
j u s t i c e s  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t 
transparently and participative. 
(Art19)
The constitutional judge in his 
appointment both as a member 
and or chairperson/vice chairman 
pronounces oaths and promises 
according to his religion before 
the President. (Art 21)
Further provisions 
regarding the terms 
and procedures for 
the appointment 
of constitutional 
j u d g e s  a r e 
regulated in the 
l a w.  ( A r t  3 5 )
Prov i s i ons regard i ng  the 
procedures for selection, selection 
and submission of constitutional 
judges are regulated by each 
authorized institution in the 
submission of constitutional 
justices and carried out objectively 
and accountably.
The fifth stage is strengthening the status of judges. The status of judges as 
state officials were initially regulated in Art 1 (1) State Official which Clean and 
Free of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism Act of 1999. Furthermore, the status 
of the judge becomes a state official already stipulated in Art 1 (4) on State Civil 
Apparatus of 2014. The status of state official is explained in Art 11 (1) letter d of 
the Act, that State Officials, one of which consists of, The Chairperson, Deputy 
Chairperson, Junior Chairperson and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as well 
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as the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson and Judges of all Justice Bodies. The 
status of the judge as a state official is reaffirmed in Art 2 on State Official Law 
of 1999 states that one of the state administrators is judge.87 This provision is 
specifically excluded from ad hoc judges. 88 By guaranteed judge status as state 
official based on the idea that judges are personnel who carry out the power 
of judiciary and not the executive. By civil servants as judge’s status it’s very 
possible to intervene on their independency because the structural, psychological, 
and character of the corps and bureaucracy carries and demands certainties. 89 
The independence of judges in the rule of law (rechtstaat) is absolutely terms. 
This is in accordance with the International Commission of Juris principles on 
independence of judge.  
There are several consequences arising from this description. First, on 
recruitment pattern, education, career, rank, the term of office, and fulfillment 
of the rights and facilities of judges as state officials. Second, state officials have 
a term of office, for example, five years and can be reelected for one period. 
However, this term cannot be applied to judges in Indonesia. This is due to 
the position of the judge not recognizing periodicity, but career and retirement. 
Besides, state officials also do not recognize rank system. However, like civil 
servants, judges have ranks or groups. The rank of the judge follows the rank 
of the civil servant. Similarly, the salary structure.90 In terms of recruitment 
and education of judge candidates, there are consequences to becoming more 
complicated. Typically, state officials are selected through the selection process 
87 The position of the judge as a state official is also stated in Art 19 Judiciary Act of 2009 which states that 
“Judges and Constitutional Judges are state officials who carry out judicial powers regulated in law.” Then in 
its development the status of this judge is also re-affirmed as stated in Art 122 (e) State Civil Apparatus Act 
of 2014 which states that State Officials are “Chairperson, vice chairman, young chairman and Supreme Judge 
and chairman, vice chairman and judge of all judicial bodies except ad hoc judges”. It should be noted in this 
latest development that the State Civil Apparatus Law issues ad hoc judges from the meaning of “judges” who 
are categorized as state officials. This of course can be a potential problem in the future, given the notion that 
the “judge” in the Judiciary Act of 2009 also covers ad-hoc judges. Taufiqurrohman Syahuri, Hakim Pasca UU 
Aparatur Sipil Negara [Judges After State Servant Officer Law] Minutes on Public Discussions Organized by 
Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan (LelP)with Forum Diskusi Hakim Indonesia (FDHI), 25 
January 2014.
88 Constitutional Court Decision No 32/PUU-XII/2014, 111-112.
89 Moh. Mahfud MD, Membangun Politik Hukum, Menegakkan Konstitusi [Building Legal Policy, Enforcing Consti-
tutionalism] (Jakarta: Radja Grafindo, 2010), 103.
90  Whereas according to Art 3 (2) Government Regulation No. 94 of 2012 concerning Financial Rights and Facilities 
of Judges under the Supreme Court, provide amount of the basic salary of judges are the same as civil servants.
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of other institutions, general elections, or appointments. So far, the pattern 
of recruitment of judges is almost similar to civil servants, although it has its 
procedures, namely through the candidate civil servant selection process and 
education for judge candidates. As a result, in 2010, the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court issued a Decree of the Chief of the Supreme Court Number 
169/KMA/SK/X/2010 concerning Implementation of the Education Program and 
Integrated Training for Judge Candidates.
IV. DEFINING ACCOUNTABILITY
In addition to defining judicial independence and how to incorporated 
many judicial reform policies, another direction of judicial reform means 
defining judicial accountability, especially in terms of open justice. Before the 
reformation era, almost all types of information that existed and managed by the 
courts were closed. In some cases, the court rejected the request of civil society 
to access court decisions. The court seemed afraid to show the decision they 
made. Also, other information which also difficult to access is the judge’s track 
record, court service fees, court budget, and others. It has become a common 
behavior. This kind of closure can only be opened through “gift” or “insider 
assistance”. You can imagine how access to clogged information contributes 
to unclean behavior in the judicial administration. in the past, the court was 
considered do not understand that open justice principles were not only seen 
from trials that were open to the public but also documents relating to the 
judicial process or access to justice. The meaning of open court is reduced 
by Judiciary Act in that era. The conclusion was in the past (new order) the 
court did not understand the principle of an open justice principle that was 
universally applicable.91 Copies of court decisions and other information are not 
91 J. J. Spigelman said that “The principle of open justice is one of the most pervasive axioms of the administration 
of justice in common law systems. It was from such origins that it became enshrined in the United States Bill 
of Rights where the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal accused the right to a ‘speedy and public trial’. 
More recently, it is incorporated in international human rights instruments such as Art 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)14 and Art 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights (‘European Convention’), as adopted and implemented by the British Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK). In both treaties, the right is expressed as an entitlement to ‘a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by law.” J. J. Spigelman, “The Principle of Open Justice: A Comparative Per-
spective,” UNSW Law Journal 29, no 2 (2006), 147.
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easy things to obtain at that time. Various stories arise about the difficulty of 
obtaining a copy of the court’s decision. Starting from academic groups such 
as students, civil society groups, and other community feels the bitterness of 
the situation. The court argued that a copy of the court decisions could only 
be given to litigants. Furthermore, the court argued that some decisions were 
confidential so that they could not be accessed by the public.92 It is difficult 
to get a copy of the court decision intertwined with obscurity and even the 
absence of information about the mechanism of this matter. For those who 
want a copy of the decisions, they will be faced with a request for money from 
a court employee so that a copy of the decision can be given or to be given 
quickly.93 In addition, the refusal to provide other public information makes 
the judiciary a bunker of the meaning of “secrecy”.94 The closure of the court 
has the potential to trigger a variety of other irregularities. For example, the 
interaction between lawyers and judges in the practice of bribery. For lawyers 
who have direct contact with judges, the issue can be made easier because 
lawyers can negotiate the decisions that will be handed down without paying 
attention to the prosecutor’s demands.
Some cases prove that even if the prosecutor demands the maximum, the 
judge can release the defendant. Unlike the case with a lawyer who does not 
have direct contact with a judge, a third party is required to contact the judge. 
Usually, the role of third parties is more practical and safer for the clerks. The 
initiative came together between the judge and the lawyer, but it can also be 
92 This mistreatment behavior of judicial officials is very obvious in ignoring the rights of court users, or the public 
in general, to access public documents or documents that are the rights of court users. Things that have become 
public knowledge are public documents in the form of court decisions, minutes of hearings, court records and 
other documents that should be accessible to court users that cannot be obtained free of charge. Judicial officials 
especially the court administration, often charge a fee to people who want to have court documents categorized 
as public documents, illegally. Masyarakat Pemantau Peradilan Indonesia Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 
Laporan Penelitian Keterbukaan Informasi Pengadilan (2014) [Reports on Open Justice] (Jakarta: Mappi-FHUI, 
2014], 31-32.
93 Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) stated that the closure of the court began to occur from the simplest thing, 
namely information about the costs of registering cases in court, especially for civil cases. At that time, ICW 
Researchers had difficulty finding information about court fees at each District Court in Jakarta. Indonesian 
Corruption Watch, Menyingkap Tabir Mafia Peradilan [Investigate the Judicial Corruption] (Jakarta: Indonesia 
Corruption Watch, 2002), 117.
94 Rifqi S. Assegaf and Josi Katarina, Membuka Ketertutupan Pengadilan [Opening Closed Judiciary] (Jakarta: Lem-
baga Kajian dan Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan, 2005), 23.
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from the clerks himself. 95 Another example, the practice of judicial corruption 
concerns a copy of the court decision on a corruption case. Copies of court 
decisions on corruption cases that have permanent legal force (inkracht) are 
high economic value. The trick is to slow down (delay) submit the copy to the 
executor. For corruptors, the late copy not only slows down the execution but 
also opens the opportunity to escape. It is not impossible, some of the corruptors 
who escaped were helped by slowing down submitting the process of executor.
The picture of this closure certainly makes people wonder, why courts snatch 
away public information rights beside provide and protect it. By blocking public 
access to information is undeniably fertilizing the practice of closed policy-
making processes, for example in terms of promotion and transfer of judges. 96 
At that time (even to date) it is unknown whether the criteria or requirements 
of a judge get promotion and transfer. The promotion and mutations at that 
time were very vulnerable to subjectivity which led to nepotism.97 Oversight 
decisions are a form of requesting responsibility to the judge and a means to 
control probability over the abuse. However, the obstruction of public access 
to court decisions led to a lack of supervision for the decision. Because of 
difficulty to access court decisions, it is not surprising the decision-based on 
the teaching process and legal discourse was difficult. 98 In the end, Liza Fahira 
concluded several reasons that caused difficulties in accessing information in 
court, among others: First, basically the culture of closure was still strong in the 
judiciary. In such cultures, even open-minded people tend to be afraid of opening 
information that should be open to the public; Second, there are intentions of 
95 The role of the clerk in a case is so extraordinarily important that it causes lawyers to do not necessarily work 
hard. For example, the clerk often made answers to the trial process for lawyers. By fully “understanding” the 
judge - in many cases, clerk of court often drafted the legal considerations - is very easy for the clerk to compile 
an answer that is acceptable to the judge’s logic. In this position, for a lawyer, who “holding” the clerk can not 
only hold a judge but also hold all the judges who handle the case. Saldi Isra, “Keterbukaan Pengadilan dan 
Akses terhadap Keadilan [Open Justice and Access to Justice]” (Paper presented at the Seminar Preparation of 
Legal Development: Background Study for 2010-2014, organized by National Planning and Development Agency, 
Jakarta, December 17th, 2008), 9.
96 Ridwan Mansyur, “Keterbukaan Informasi Di Peradilan Dalam Rangka Implementasi Integritas dan Kepastian 
Hukum [Court Disclosure Information to Implement Judicial Integrity and Legal Certainty],” Jurnal Hukum dan 
Peradilan  4, no 1 (March 2015), 89.
97 Rifqi S Assegaf, Pelatihan Keterbukaan Informasi Pengadilan [Short Course on Judicial Transparancy] (Bandung: 
USAID-C4J, 2011), 66.
98 Rifqi S. Assegaf and Josi Katarina, Membuka Ketertutupan Pengadilan [Opening Closed Judiciary], 91.
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certain officials in the court, including judges, to cover up information, both to 
avoid public attention to the mistakes or negative practices they have committed, 
to be able to extort information requesters or because of other motives; Third, 
there are weaknesses in legislation which led to open interpretation to certain 
information may not be open to the public.99
After Amendment of the 1945 Constitution, the judicial reform agenda 
desired another movement to defining judicial accountability not only focusing 
on judicial independence sector. In line with this, openness justice principles 
were realized by some judges, especially by the Chief of Supreme Court, Bagir 
Manan. The Chief Justice continuously emphasized openness in the court and 
called on judges and court officials to uphold openness.100 The next step was 
taken through Blueprint Book of 2003 on Supreme Court Reform Agenda. In the 
Blueprint there was a recommendation that DPR, President, and the Supreme 
Court shall make a rule that grants easier access court information, including 
court decisions.101 This was also recommended by Bagir Manan as Chief Justice 
of Supreme Court; Toton Suprapto and Marianna Sutadi as Junior Chief Justice; 
and Supreme Court Judge, Abdul Rahman Saleh.102 One main indicator of success 
on the Blueprint is forming “rules grant people to have easier access on court 
decisions.” 103 Even though Supreme Court Act of 2004 was passed about four 
months after the ratification of Constitutional Court Act of 2003, but Supreme 
Court Act of 2004 does not include the responsibility and accountability section 
in the clause. In Chapter III Part Two Art 12 until Art 14 Constitutional Court 
Act of 2003 is explicitly determined: First, the Constitutional Court is responsible 
99 Liza Fahrihah, "Mendorong Keterbukaan Informasi di Pengadilan [Towards Judicial Transparency]" in Bunga 
Rampai Kisah Masyarakat Sipil Melawan Korupsi [Selective Story on Civil Society fighting against corruption], 
ed. Liza Fahrihah (Jakarta: LeIP, 2014), 35.
100 Information systems aim to build the transparency of the justice system. Openness is not only meant as a form 
of public service, but also a creating control system for the judicial process. Public access to every court deci-
sion is important for judicial reform. Public access will encourage judges to be careful, qualified and impartial 
considering that each decision or determination will be a discourse or scientific observation. Bagir Manan, Sistem 
Peradilan Berwibawa (Suatu Pencarian) [Judicial Dignity] (Yogyakarta: FH UII Press, 2005), 11.
101 Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, Cetak Biru Pembaruan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia [Blue Print 
on Reformation of Supreme Court], 101.
102 Liza Fahrihah, Mendorong Keterbukaan Informasi di Pengadilan [Towards Judicial Transparancy], 36.
103 Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, Cetak Biru Pembaruan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia [Blue Print 
on Reformation of Supreme Court], 102.
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for regulating organization, personnel, administration, and finance in accordance 
with the principles of good and clean governance; Second, the Constitutional 
Court is obliged to publicly announce periodic reports concerning: (a) applications 
that are registered, inspected and decided; (b) financial management and other 
administrative tasks. The report is published in periodic news published by the 
Constitutional Court; and Third, people have access to obtain the Constitutional 
Court. However Supreme Court argues that even without inclusion certain norms 
in Supreme Court Act on 2003, it doesn’t mean there is no effort to improve 
the performance. For example, the Supreme Court has set vision and mission, 
namely “Realizing the rule of law through judiciary that is independent, effective, 
efficient and obtains public trust, professionalism and provides legal services 
that are quality, ethical, affordable and low cost for the community and able 
to answer calls public service”.104 
As a form of follow-up, the Chief Justice formed an internal team for the 
Chief Justice Decree concerning implemented open justice principles, which then 
resulted in Chief Justice Supreme Court Decree Number 144/KMA/SK/VIII/2007 
concerning Information Disclosure in the Court. In the drafting process, the 
toughest debate occurred was the issue of transparency in court decisions. The 
Supreme Court, especially the Chief Justice, saw that the court’s decision was 
their livelihood and image, so there was resistance to the proposal which put 
court decisions have to be Published by the court.105 Furthermore, there is a 
paradigm that the publication of court decisions is an additional criminal sanction 
which stipulated in Art 10 Criminal Code. Also, there is another issue related 
to Judges Intellectual Property Rights, if it has to be published. Some Supreme 
Court Judges considered the decision they produced had intellectual property 
rights so it should not be published. In the end, court decisions remain in the 
category of “information that the court must announce”. The Decree stipulates 
that the decisions on District Courts and Appellate Courts that have not been 
104 Ridwan Mansyur, Keterbukaan Informasi di Peradilan [Openness Information in Court], 89.
105 Dimas Prasidi, “Akses Publik terhadap Informasi di Pengadilan [Public Access to Information in Court],” Jurnal 
Konstitusi 7, no. 3 (June 2010), 179-180.
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legally binding in certain cases are included in that category. Other issues that 
have been debated are the session agenda, personal information excluded from 
the verdict, and the method of providing information. 
In the end, the Chief Justice of Supreme Court Decree has set new standard 
for managing information and public services. The Chief Justice of Supreme 
Court Decree also initiated a fundamental change in the development of the 
bureaucracy in the judiciary. Meanwhile, the public Information Disclosure 
Act of 2008 is claimed to be the key to opening the gate towards a significant 
change for upgrading the performance of public services and aims to facilitate 
public access and transparency, including bureaucracy in judiciary.106 The Chief 
Justice Supreme Court Decree was a breakthrough and meaningful inheritance 
of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Bagir Manan. This breakthrough is 
one of the recommendations on Blueprint Book of 2003 on Supreme Court 
Reform Agenda. The recommendation is that court decisions can be accessed by 
the public, for the benefit of learning and as a comparison of data for internal 
court circles. There are many general principles which accommodated on The 
Decree, among other: 107 First, Maximum Access Limited Exemption – MALE, 
which requires majority information managed by the court to be open and set an 
exception to cover up information which is only for the greater public interest, 
privacy, and the commercial interests of a person or legal entity: Second, no 
reason needed if someone requests public or court information. Third, Organizing 
access to information with cheap, fast, accurate and timely; Forth, Providing 
complete and correct information; Fifth, proactive to  information which related 
to the court which is important to be known by the public; Sixth, provided 
administrative sanctions for parties that intentionally obstruct or hinder public 
access to information in court; and seventh, provided a simple objections and 
appeals mechanism for parties who feel their rights to obtain information in 
the court are not fulfilled. 
106 Ibid., 180
107 Art 2 Chief Justice of Supreme Court Decree No. 144/KMA/SK/VIII/2007 concerning Information Disclosure in the Court.
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In 2011, The Supreme Court made some adjustments with reforming the 
decree by forming Chief Justice of Supreme Court Decree No 1-144/KMA/SK/I/2011 
concerning the Guidelines of Information Service at the Court. Through the new 
Decree, coordination of implementation of public services for open justice more 
optimized. The Decree stated that information service has two procedures, among 
other (1) general procedures and (2) special procedures. The main difference is 
if the general procedure start with an application for information is submitted 
indirectly while the special procedure vice versa. The Principal Officers must 
be at the Supreme Court and the four Courts Chamber for implementation of 
this service, so the chart of a desk job as follows:
Tabel 3. Information Service Management at Supreme Court and Below
Manager










Court Leaders Court Leader Case: Supreme Court 
Clerks
















Officer at Supreme 
Court: Head Bureau of 
Law & Public Relations, 
Administrative Affairs 
Agency 
Work Unit: Every 
Director General/ Head 
of Body 
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Court
Administration Body: 
Subdivision of Data & 
Services Information 
Directorate General: 
Head of Subdivision 
of Documentation & 
Information 
Research, Development 
and Education Agency: 






at the echelon 
level IV
Leadership 
unit at the 
echelon level 
IV
Leadership unit at the 
echelon level IV
After establishment Public Service Act of 2009, the Chief Justice Supreme 
Court issued another Decree Number 026/KMA/SK/II/2012 concerning Standard 
Judicial Services as the basis for each work unit in all judicial bodies in providing 
services to the public. Court Service Standards consist of case and non-court 
services. Court service standards also mandate establishment of service standards 
for smaller work units to be adjusted to their respective characteristics, for 
example, geographical conditions and case characteristics. In general, the Service 
Standards in the Court include: Court Administrative Services, Legal Aid Services, 
Complaint Services and Information Request Services. Therefore, the issuance of 
Public Service Act of 2009 and the Chief Justice of Supreme Court Decree No. 
026/KMA/SK/II/2012 establishes regulations regarding efforts to implement open 
justice principles in another part of defining judicial accountability in Indonesia 
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the consequences of constitutional guaranteed on 
judicial independence in the third amendment, judicial reform agenda carried 
out with two types policy, among other (1) institutional guarantee of judicial 
independence and (2) personal guarantee independence of judicial independence. 
Relating to institutional guarantees are included in several policies, namely (i) 
one roof system and room system in the Supreme Court, (ii) Establishment of 
special courts, and (iii) institutionalization of judicial review on perpetrators of 
judicial power. While personal guarantees are poured on policies (i) reforming 
the filling and dismissal of judges and (ii) structuring the status of judges. 
Furthermore, judicial accountability is divided into two patterns, namely 
(1) institutional accountability and (2) personal accountability. The pouring 
institutional accountability is reflected in the regulation of information disclosure 
in the judiciary initiated by the judiciary’s own power as well as legislation 
which indirectly encourages the personal accountability of judges for all their 
activities in the technical domain of the judiciary. 
This article also shows that legal policy concerning judicial independence 
and justice accountability as goals of judicial reform after the reformation is 
focused on the institutional development rather than the personal (judges) 
independence and accountability of judges. Finally, this policy creates an 
unbalanced situation in achieving the objectives of judicial reform which also 
creating a gap between institutional development and enhancing the integrity 
capacity of judges. However, as a recommendation, that the legislators need 
to make comprehensive changes relating to the Law on Judicial Power such as 
the Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court Act, the Constitutional Court Act, and 
including the Judicial Commission Act. These changes are intended to organize 
the upstream and downstream sides of the judiciary system. The upstream side 
as intended is related to the filling and structuring of jurisdiction especially 
concerning special courts. Meanwhile, the downstream side is related to 
supervision and dismissal mechanism of judges
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